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We study the wage vulnerability to the stay-at-home orders and social distancing 
measures imposed to prevent COVID-19 contagion in the US by education, race, gender, 
and state. Under 2 months of lockdown plus 10 months of partial functioning we find that 
both wage inequality and poverty increase in the US for all social groups and states. For 
the whole country, we estimate an increase in inequality of 4.1 Gini points and of 9.7 
percentage points for poverty, with uneven increases by race, gender, and education. The 
restrictions imposed to curb the spread of the pandemic produce a double process of 
divergence: both inequality within and between social groups increase, with education 
accounting for the largest part of the rise in inequality between groups. We also find that 
education level differences impact wage poverty risk more than differences by race or 
gender, making lower-educated groups the most vulnerable while graduates of any race 
and gender are similarly less exposed. When measuring mobility as the percentile rank 
change, most women with secondary education or higher move up, while most men 
without higher education suffer downward mobility. Our findings can inform public 
policy aiming to address the disparities in vulnerability to pandemic-related shocks across 
different socioeconomic groups. 
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The lockdown and social distancing measures imposed by governments have been vital 
to control the COVID-19 pandemic around the world, save lives and avoid the collapse 
of healthcare systems, but have also had dramatic economic consequences.2 Thus, the 
International Monetary Fund estimates a global growth contraction of 3.5 percent for 
2020, being the drop in real GDP for the advanced economies 4.9 percent (IMF, 2021).  
Importantly, the policies necessary to curb the pandemic are estimated to produce also 
significant distributional changes (Bartik et al., 2020; Bonacini et al., 2020, Furcery et al., 
2020; Palomino et al., 2020; Kim et al., 2021). One central reason for this distributional 
impact is that stay-at-home orders and social distancing measures generate an asymmetric 
effect on the labor market. While essential occupations like health services, food industry 
and freight transport keep functioning during the pandemic, activities like restoration, 
accommodation and entertainment are significantly limited or even shut down. The rest 
of the activities are carried out, but only if they can be done from home. Employees able 
to continue to work maintain their earnings, while those who cannot work can only draw 
on their eventual savings to get by if there are not compensatory measures by 
governments. This uneven impact across workers can not only cause significant changes 
in inequality and poverty at the national level but also affect social groups with different 
intensity and increase disparities among them. To evaluate these disparities, we estimate 
the distributional effects of the stay-at-home orders and social distancing restrictions on 
the wage distribution in the US, and the vulnerability ─in terms of wage inequality, 
poverty and mobility─ by race, gender, education level and state of residence.3 
We are guided by the events and measures observed in the US during the first year of the 
pandemic to assess the impact of the restrictions implemented to limit the spread of 
COVID-19. Thus, we assume two months of lockdown plus ten months of partial 
functioning for the closed occupations, during which they operate at different levels of 
 
2 The public health consequences of stay-at-home orders to curb the spread of COVID-19 in the US have 
been evaluated in Friedson et al. (2020). Qiu et al. (2020) show that movement restrictions and enforced 
social distancing did have an effect in stopping the spread of the virus in China’s early wave. Comparing a 
set of countries with different policies, Moosa (2020) finds a relation between the timeliness and strictness 
of the measures and the containment of the virus spread in the early stages of the pandemic. 
3 The effects of stay-at-home orders and social distancing policies on measures of inequality such as the 
Gini index have been studied for a number of European countries by Palomino et al. (2020) and Almeida 
et al. (2020). Instead, O’Donoghue et al. (2020), Brunori et al. (2020), and Li et al. (2020) have focused on 
the cases of Ireland, Italy, and Australia, respectively. As far as we are aware, this analysis has not yet been 
done for the US. (See Stantcheva, 2021 for a review of the literature on this topic up to date).  
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their total capacity depending on the stage of the first and second waves of the pandemic 
that the economy is in. This scenario is consistent both with the decisions adopted by the 
Federal and State governments and with the consumers’ voluntary change in behaviour 
to prevent contagion (Goolsbee and Syverson, 2021). We concentrate on the effect of 
enforced and voluntary social distancing and do not consider indirect effects like 
shortages in the supply chains and reductions in consumption due to income effects to 
understand better the link between the wage distributional changes caused by COVID-19 
restrictions and the productive structure of the economy. During the pandemic, the 
prevalence of different types of economic activities −essential, closed or teleworkable− 
will determine the extent at which enforced and voluntary distancing impact in the 
economy as a whole and the different regions and social groups. 
Given that the type of occupation a worker has is likely to be connected to some extent 
with personal characteristics like race or education, we can also expect an uneven effect 
of the restrictions due to the pandemic on different social groups. For example, Kim et al. 
(2021) find that less-educated Asian Americans are substantially more likely to lose 
employment than equally educated Whites because of the lockdown (see also, Fairlie et 
al., 2020, and Montenovo et al., 2020). Likewise, Bartik et al. (2020) observe that the 
negative economic effect of the lockdown is more conspicuous among less-educated 
workers than among the highly educated. To examine which groups of workers suffer the 
most from the lockdown and social distancing, we consider here four important individual 
characteristics: race, gender, education and state of residence. In addition, we contrast the 
relative importance of each of the four dimensions.4 
To calculate the changes in wage inequality and poverty, we need first to measure the 
ability of individuals to work under the pandemic. Our tool for this purpose is the 
Lockdown Working Ability (LWA) index, which incorporates the occupation’s ability to 
work from home (Dingel and Neiman, 2020) and, crucially, adjusts this for workers 
whose occupation is essential ─they are not affected by social distance regardless of their 
teleworking capacity─ and for those whose occupation is closed and are unable to work 
(Palomino et al., 2020). We then compute the potential wage loss due to the lockdown 
 
4 Note that no significant effect of the gender and race dimensions in terms of compliance with social 
distancing norms has been found in the US (Papageorge et al. 2021). Also, the labor market impact of the 
stay-at-home orders and capacity restrictions estimated here takes place at the workplace level and is not 




and the de-escalation period for all workers and measure the changes in wage inequality 
and poverty in the US by race, gender, education and state of residence. For inequality 
measurement we employ the popular Gini coefficient and the Mean Logarithmic 
Deviation (MLD), which is the only additively decomposable inequality index 
(Bourguignon, 1979; Shorrocks, 1980) that has a path-independent decomposition (Foster 
and Shneyerov, 2000). This properties of the MLD will later help us to decompose overall 
inequality in the US into the between- and within-groups inequality components, both 
nationally and by social groups and states. We measure changes in poverty by computing 
the variation in the headcount poverty index ─the percentage of workers whose income 
falls below the poverty line─ caused by the lockdown and social distancing.  
We estimate that during the COVID-19 pandemic the Gini index increases 4.1 Gini points 
at the national level and in each and every one of the US states (ranging between 2.6 Gini 
points in District of Columbia and 6.6 in Nevada). When total inequality is decomposed 
in the within- and the between-groups components (according to individual’s education, 
race, gender, and state), we find that the restrictions imposed to curb the spread of the 
pandemic imply the increase of both within- and between-groups inequality in the US, 
although their relative contribution remains the same. More importantly, it is observed 
that, among the four factors under consideration, education accounts for more than 60% 
of the between-groups inequality component and is the only factor whose weight in the 
between-groups inequality component increases during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The percentage of workers whose wages are below the poverty line also rises at the 
national level (9.7 percent points) and in each and every one of the US states (between 
4.7 percent points in District of Columbia and 18.7 in Nevada). By social groups, poverty 
(measured by the headcount ratio) rises the most for Asians (men and women) with 
secondary education or lower, while it increases the least for Asians (men and women) 
and Black women with tertiary education. It seems that Asians are in fact affected as two 
separate groups according to their level of education (Berringer et al., 1990). When we 
approximate the relative poverty risk of a population group as the change in the poverty 
of this group relative to the change in overall poverty, we observe that Whites, Asians, 
women and workers with tertiary education have a lower-than-average risk. Also, 
regardless of the gender and race considered, all groups tend to reduce their relative 
poverty risk as their level of education increases, and differences in relative poverty risk 
among sexes and races tend to disappear. In fact, differences for the group of graduated 
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workers are almost inexistent. These findings apply to the US not only at the national 
level but also occur within all states. Thus, it seems that, also for poverty, the educational 
level is the most important of the analyzed dimensions in driving the effects of COVID-
19 restrictions on the wage distribution of workers.  
Finally, by comparing the wage distributions before and after the stay-at-home orders and 
social distancing measures, we estimate wage mobility as the change in the mean 
percentile rank of workers from different groups. We find that, in the overall wage 
distribution rank, women tend to move up, especially those with secondary or higher 
education, while men from all races tend to move down unless they have higher 
education. Asians (men and women) move up only when they are graduated, and 
otherwise suffer the strongest decrease, while black women move up for all education 
levels. 
Our findings call for public policies to alleviate the economic consequences of the 
restrictions imposed to curb the spread of the COVID-19 that take these differential 
effects into account. This could contribute to maximize the effectiveness of the measures 
and, crucially, to address the structural vulnerability of the most affected groups in the 
labor market. 
The three emergency assistance programmes implemented in the US so far ─the CARES 
Act in March 27th 2020, the Consolidated Appropriations Act in December 27th 2020, and 
the American Rescue Plan Act in March 11th 2021─ have provided personal stimulus 
checks (unrelated to occupation) to all individuals and families below certain income 
thresholds ($75,000 if single or married but filed taxes separately, $112,000 if filed as 
head of household, and $150,000 if married and filed a joint tax return), taking into 
account the number of children and dependents or disabled adults in each household. 
They have also established an enhanced general scheme of benefits to unemployed 
individuals who submitted a tax return in the US until September 2021. However, the 
challenges of inequality and poverty imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic need to be 
tackled at various levels. Support for workers in the most affected industries and 
occupations is critical, but our findings also call for occupational and education policies 
that increase the resilience of the most vulnerable groups in the labor market. If anything, 
our results show very clearly the extent of existing inequalities in the quality of jobs 
accessible to different groups. Policies that expand education and access to quality 
employment contribute to counteract the rise in poverty and wage inequality caused by 
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the stay-at-home orders and social distancing conditions for the most affected goups, 
increasing at the same time the resilience against potential future economic shocks. 
Additionally, more equal opportunities for people with different backgrounds and in 
different regions will help to extend the use of new technologies to groups of 
disadvantaged workers who otherwise would be left behind, which can increase overall 
productivity (Marrero and Rodríguez, 2013).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we measure the ability of the 
US labor force to work during the pandemic and estimate the changes in wage inequality 
and poverty for the US by race, gender, education and state. The changes in the within- 
and between-groups inequality components for all social groups and states are obtained 
in Section 3. Next, the variations in the relative poverty risk and mobility of the US 
workers are analyzed in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The ability to work under the pandemic and its effects on inequality and poverty 
To evaluate the working ability of employees during the lockdown and social distancing, 
we need first to identify which occupations are essential and which occupations are 
partially or totally closed to contain the spread of COVID-19. Based on the decisions 
made by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the US about 
essential critical infrastructure workers, we have defined the essential and closed 
occupations using the occupation and industry codes of the American Community Survey 
(ACS) (see Appendix A). 
 Then, following Dingel and Neiman (2020), we have estimated occupational teleworking 
from the American O*NET (O*NET-SOC 2010) database and then translated it into ACS 
occupational data (ACS SOC 2018) which includes demographic variables like race and 
gender along with economic information (e.g., occupation, industry, salary, and 
education). The ACS sample covers 5% of the US population and for our analysis we 
have considered only those individuals aged 16-64 who were working in the previous 
year of the survey. We drop from the sample workers with zero wages, residents of 
institutional group quarters (prisons and psychiatric institutions), unpaid family workers, 
and individuals that still attend the school and work less than 20 hours per week or less 
than 13 weeks in the last year. The final size of our sample is 1,381,501 observations and 
we use the Census sampling weights for all our calculations.  
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After identifying essential (!) and closed (") occupations, we construct the Lockdown 
Working Ability (LWA) index (Palomino et al., 2020). First, we divide the population of 
# workers into three groups according to the occupation $! of each worker 	& ∈
{1, 2, … , #}. If the worker has an essential occupation ($! = !), we compute the index as 
/01! 	= 	2! 	 + (1 − 2!)7!, where 2! ∈ (0,1] is the essentiality score given to the 
occupation of the individual (see Table A2 in Appendix A) and 7! ∈ [0,1] is the value of 
her index of teleworking (see Table A4 in Appendix A). Note that for partially essential 
occupations (0 < 2! < 1), workers can work during lockdown only to the extent that their 
occupation is essential 2! and that their non-essential tasks (1 − 2!) are teleworkable. If 
the occupation of the worker is closed ($! = "), /01! 	= 	 (1 − <!)7!, where <! ∈ (0,1] 
is the close score given to the closed job of the employee (see Table A3 in Appendix A). 
Fully closed occupations (<! = 1) cannot work at all, while in partially closed 
occupations (0 < <! < 1), the non-closed share of the occupation (1 − <!) can work to 
the extend that is teleworkable. Finally, if the individual has an occupation that is neither 
essential nor closed, the value of her /01! index is equal to the value of her index of 
teleworking, 7! ∈ [0,1]. 
Then, we calculate the wage loss (=>) experienced by every worker during the lockdown 
(2 months) as =>!" = =!"#$ ·
%
$% · (1 − /01!) where =!"#$ is the annual wage of 
individual & in period @ − 1 (before the lockdown) and %$% represents the duration of the 
two-month lockdown in annual terms. If the job of the worker is closed, we need to 
consider additionally the wage loss due to the partial functioning of her occupation for 
ten additional months.5 Following the events observed in the US we consider that the 
partial functioning of closed occupations evolved during the de-escalation period 
according to two consecutive waves. After the lockdown, the first wave of the virus 
decreased until its minimum in mid-September 2020. Later, the second wave began, and 
after reaching its maximum in mid-January 2021 it started decreasing gradually over the 
rest of 2021. This pattern is also consistent in a stylized way with the high-frequency data 
collected on consumption for closed sectors (entertainment and hospitality) reported by 
 
5 The lockdown in the US started on March 13th, 2020, and lasted for circa two months in the majority of 
the US States. By considering ten months for the de-escalation period, we simulate the economic 
consequences of the COVID-19 restrictions for a full year, which allows a year-to-year comparison of the 
pre- and post-pandemic wage distribution. 
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Chetty et al., (2020) and analyzed also by Dong et al., (2021). We represent this evolution 
over time and formalize it mathematically in Appendix B.  
For this scenario of two months of lockdown and ten months of de-escalation in two 
waves, the equation that we estimate is the following:  
 =>!" = =!"#$ A
%
$% · (1 − /01!) + 1& · <! ·
$
$% · B∫ D
'#%(
% EF + 0.8∫ I
|$*#'|$%
( EFJK, (1) 
where 1& = L
1 &M	$! = "	
0 &M	$! ≠ "
 and the ratio 
$
$% in the second summand is a normalization 
term to transform monthly data into annual data. The index F defines the month under 
consideration, and the variable D represents the exponential decrease of closure in the de-
escalation between the 2nd and 6th months, counting from the onset of the lockdown, so 
that the functioning of closed occupations reaches 80% of full capacity (20% closure) in 
the 6th month. The term I is obtained to represent a second wave with four months of 
exponential increase in closure (up to 80% of closure in the 10th month) and two months 
of exponential decrease, down to 40% of closure in the 12th month.6 
By calculating the wage loss for all workers using the LWA, we can compute the change 
in our metrics of inequality and poverty comparing the wage distributions before and 
under the restrictions due to the pandemic. We apply two indices of income inequality, 
the Gini coefficient and the MLD.7 The former is the most widely used inequality index 
in the literature, while the latter is the only additively decomposable inequality index that 
has a path-independent decomposition (Foster and Shneyerov, 2000). This property will 
help us decompose overall inequality in the US into the between- and within-groups 
inequality components in the next section, taking into account the gender, race, education 
and state dimensions when constructing the groups. In addition, we compute the change 
in the headcount poverty index driven by the stay-at-home orders and social distancing 
 
6 The values of ! and " to model these levels of closure are, respectively, 0.67 and 0.71 (see Appendix B). 
7 The Gini coefficient is defined as: 





where % represents the wage distribution, %% is the salary of individual +, and , is the mean wage of the 
economy. Meanwhile, the MLD is: 






measures on labor market earnings. We show our main results in Table 1 (see also Table 
C1 and Figure C1 in appendix C). 
The average ability of workers to work during the pandemic (LWA index) varies across 
US states, but no particular pattern is found by geographical regions.8 Still, we observe 
that the LWA index is lower in states with a low score of essentiality and a large score of 
closure, such as Nevada, Florida and Hawaii, while it is higher in states with large scores 
of teleworking like the District of Columbia, Massachusetts and Maryland (see Figure C1 
and Table C1 in appendix C).  
However, we see clear patterns in the average LWA index for different social groups, 
showing that the access to jobs resilient to the pandemic shock is largely unequal. First, 
the relationship between the LWA index and the educational level attained by workers is 
positive and monotonic: the more educated the worker, the higher her capacity to work 
during the pandemic (Table 1). Second, women show a higher capacity to work under 
lockdown and social distancing than men for all races (particularly among Blacks) and 
for all combinations of race and education (except for Hispanics and ‘Other Race’ when 
their level of education is the lowest). Third, Asians reach both the largest and the smallest 
values of the LWA index, depending on their educational level: when we focus on 
workers with primary or no education, Asians are the racial group with occupations less 
able to keep their labor activity under the pandemic, while the opposite happens when we 
consider graduate Asians. They are, in fact, the group of workers occupationally best 
prepared to bear the working restrictions of the pandemic (Table 1).  
Now, if we look at the LWA index by social groups across states, the patters are similar 
to those found at the national level. The monotonic positive relationship between the 
average value of the LWA index and the educational level of workers is observed in all 
states except Idaho and Vermont. Women show –like they did at the national level– a 
higher LWA index than men in all states without exception. Among racial groups, Others 
and Hispanics have the lowest average LWA index in most states (Table C1 in appendix 
C).  
The different capacity to work during the pandemic that workers have will translate in an 
increase in our measures of inequality. The Gini index increases 4.1 points at the national 
 
8 Forsythe et al. (2020) also find that the initial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on labor demand was 
relatively homogeneous across the U.S. states. 
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level, and between 2.6 points (District of Columbia) and 6.6 points (Nevada) at the state 
level. According to the MLD, inequality increases 10.7 points at the national level and 
between 7.9 points (Nebraska) and 12.9 points (Nevada) at the state level (see Table 1 
and Table D1 in Appendix D).9 By population subgroups, both the Gini coefficient and 
the MLD show that the increase inequality is greater as we consider groups with lower 
education levels, and this is consistent in the overall population and also across all racial 
groups. When we focus on the racial dimension, it stands out that the increase in 
inequality within the white workers group is markedly lower than in the rest of the racial 
groups. Looking at the gender differences, inequality increases more among women than 
among men at the lower level of education overall and across all races. The opposite 
happens at the higher levels of education, with the subgroup of graduate women 
experimenting a lower increase in inequality than the subgroup of graduate men.  
However, more than in inequality changes within different subgroups, one would 
probably be more interested in the changes on poverty that occur for the whole of the 
workforce and for each of the social subgroups considered after the restrictions. The 
percentage of workers with wages that would fall below the poverty line (60% of the 
median wage) rises at the national level (9.7 percent points) and in each and every one of 
the US states (between 4.7 percent points in District of Columbia and 18.7 percent points 
in Nevada) (see Table 1 and Table D1 in Appendix D). There is a lower average increase 
in headcount poverty for Whites than for the other races but crossing the race and 
education dimensions provides a sharper picture. The headcount ratio rises the most for 
Asians with no more than secondary education (women and men), while it increases the 
least for Black women and Asians with tertiary education (women and men). It thus seems 
that for poverty increases, Asians are two completely different groups depending on their 
attained level of education (Berringer et al., 1990). By gender, poverty increases are larger 
for men, especially in the Black and Hispanic racial groups. Overall and across all racial 
groups, high-educated workers (graduate) are much less likely to go into poverty than all 




9 Because the MLD index is more sensitive to small wages than the Gini coefficient, our results for this 
index can be slightly different. 
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3. Changes in between- and within-groups inequality 
One of our main findings is that overall wage inequality increases in the whole US by 4.1 
Gini points and 10.7 MLD points. The size of these values flags the importance of 
implementing economic policy measures that counteract the expected increase in 
inequality after the restrictions imposed to prevent the spread of the pandemic. However, 
to design the most accurate policy measures it is fundamental to find insights about which 
are the socioeconomic characteristics underlying the observed changes. 
The unique properties of the MLD index allow us to undertake this enterprise by 
computing the changes in the shares of inequality between and within groups 
(Bourguignon, 1979; Shorrocks, 1980) when considering race, gender, education and 
state of residence (Table 2).10 Thus, we observe that in the original distribution between-
races inequality represents 4.1% of total inequality, and that when we divide the 
population by gender instead, between gender inequality is 3.4% of total inequality. 
Analogously, the between component is 16.3% when splitting by levels of education and 
2.0% when splitting by state. Overall, when dividing the population by finer groups 
considering all possible combinations of the four dimensions, 23.6% of total pre-
pandemic inequality is associated with inequality between these different groups, while 
76.4% occurs within them. Additionally, by applying the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) 
-which averages the effect of all possible combinations of individual characteristics- to 
the between-groups inequality component, one can obtain the contribution of each 
dimension to the between component (last module of Table 2).11 We can see that 
education is by far the highest contributor (63.4% of the between-group inequality), 
followed by race, gender and state of residence.  
 
 
10 Formally, the decomposition of the MLD is the following. Let % = ( %!,   . . . , %)) be a partition of the 
wage distribution into K groups, being 1* the population size associated with the wage distribution %*, 
where 1 = ∑ 1*)*'! , and ,* the mean of %*. After grouping workers by their socioeconomic characteristics 
and states, the MLD index can be exactly decomposed as 
7(%) = 7(,!1+# , ,"1+! , … , ,)1+$) + ∑ +%+ 7(%
*))*'! , 
where 1+ is a vector of ones of size 1. The first component, 7(,!1+# , ,"1+! , … , ,)1+$), is the between-
groups inequality component which captures the level of wage inequality that would arise if each worker 
in a group enjoys the mean wage of the group. The second component, ∑ +%+ 7(%
*))*'! , is the weighted sum 
of wage inequalities within different groups (within-groups inequality). 
11 The Shapley value decomposition is the only decomposition method that solves the tension between 








Note: All changes in the Gini coefficient, MLD index and Headcount ratio are in basic points and calculated by comparing each indicator after 2 two months of lockdown plus 10 months of partial 
closure with their pre-pandemic value.
Race Gender
Primary Secondary Post-Secondary Graduate Total Primary Secondary
Post-
Secondary Graduate Total Primary Secondary
Post-
Secondary Graduate Total Primary Secondary
Post-
Secondary Graduate Total
Female 0.32 0.39 0.58 0.82 0.68 8.3 7.5 5.9 2.1 4.2 13.5 12.5 12.5 5.9 12.3 19.1 20.5 12.8 4.2 9.2
Male 0.28 0.34 0.47 0.80 0.63 6.8 6.4 5.6 2.2 4.0 12.1 10.9 11.3 5.7 11.5 19.4 20.4 14.2 4.4 9.5
Total 0.30 0.36 0.52 0.81 0.65 7.5 6.9 5.6 2.1 4.0 13.1 11.8 11.7 5.7 11.9 19.3 20.5 13.5 4.3 9.4
Female 0.44 0.52 0.63 0.82 0.64 6.6 5.2 4.5 2.1 4.4 14.6 10.3 9.0 4.5 10.4 9.0 11.5 9.7 4.2 8.5
Male 0.30 0.32 0.43 0.70 0.45 5.0 4.9 4.9 3.3 5.1 11.3 9.4 9.8 7.0 11.1 13.7 15.6 13.5 7.8 13.0
Total 0.37 0.41 0.54 0.77 0.55 5.5 4.8 4.4 2.5 4.6 12.7 9.5 9.1 5.4 10.5 11.4 13.7 11.4 5.7 10.6
Female 0.34 0.45 0.61 0.78 0.57 6.3 6.9 5.2 2.3 5.7 9.7 11.9 10.5 6.0 12.4 15.0 13.7 10.7 5.5 10.9
Male 0.35 0.35 0.46 0.72 0.44 3.7 4.8 4.9 3.2 4.9 6.1 8.3 9.8 7.2 9.8 16.7 16.2 13.1 6.7 13.8
Total 0.35 0.40 0.53 0.75 0.50 4.8 5.4 4.7 2.6 5.0 8.4 9.9 9.9 6.4 10.9 16.1 15.2 11.9 6.1 12.5
Female 0.33 0.44 0.58 0.77 0.55 6.1 6.8 5.7 2.8 5.9 9.8 12.2 11.4 6.8 13.0 15.3 14.6 10.8 6.4 11.4
Male 0.34 0.35 0.44 0.69 0.43 4.4 5.2 5.3 3.4 5.3 7.1 9.2 10.1 7.9 10.5 17.3 16.5 14.4 6.9 14.4
Total 0.34 0.39 0.51 0.73 0.48 5.1 5.6 5.2 3.0 5.4 8.8 10.4 10.5 7.2 11.5 16.6 15.7 12.6 6.6 13.1
Female 0.37 0.52 0.65 0.81 0.68 6.1 5.6 4.6 2.0 3.9 14.7 11.1 10.2 5.2 10.3 11.0 12.6 9.6 4.6 8.1
Male 0.32 0.37 0.48 0.75 0.54 3.7 3.8 4.1 2.4 3.9 10.3 7.7 8.8 5.9 9.7 10.9 12.1 10.5 4.7 8.8
Total 0.34 0.43 0.56 0.78 0.61 4.5 4.1 3.9 2.1 3.6 12.8 9.1 9.1 5.4 9.8 11.0 12.3 10.1 4.7 8.4
Female 0.36 0.50 0.63 0.81 0.65 6.4 5.9 4.8 2.1 4.3 12.2 11.3 10.3 5.3 10.6 13.3 13.1 10.0 4.7 8.8
Male 0.33 0.35 0.47 0.75 0.52 4.1 4.3 4.4 2.5 4.3 8.6 8.5 9.4 6.3 11.2 14.8 13.9 11.7 5.2 10.4
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While the pandemic certainly increases wage inequality as measured by the MLD index 
from 0.47 to 0.58, the relative distribution of inequality in the between- and within-group 
components when considering the four factors remains unchanged: the share of the 
between component is still 23.6%. However, the contribution of each of the factors to 
between-group inequality does change, revealing that, after accounting for the effects of 
the pandemic, education is the only factor whose contribution increases (in 4.9 percentage 
points), explaining now even a greater share of the between component (68.3%). The 
contribution of race and state of residence decreases only slightly, while there is a 
significant reduction (4.0 percentage points) in the contribution of gender. In other words, 
the stay-at-home orders and social distancing measures widen the average differences in 
wage between groups of people with different educational levels, while it decreases the 
average differences in wage by gender.   
 




4. The relative poverty risk of being the member of a particular social group 
The changes in poverty shown in Table 1 also suggest that the measures necessary to fight 
the COVID-19 pandemic have an asymmetric effect on the risk of becoming poor across 
social groups. Taking advantage of the additive decomposability of the headcount ratio, 











Inequality (MLD) Total 0.470 0.576 0.107
Race Within 0.450 95.9 0.553 96.0 0.103 0.08
Between 0.019 4.1 0.023 4.0 0.004 -0.08
Gender Within 0.454 96.6 0.562 97.6 0.109 0.95
Between 0.016 3.4 0.014 2.4 -0.002 -0.95
Education Within 0.393 83.7 0.475 82.5 0.082 -1.21
Between 0.077 16.3 0.101 17.5 0.024 1.21
State Within 0.460 98.0 0.565 98.1 0.105 0.06
Between 0.009 2.0 0.011 1.9 0.002 -0.06
All groups Within 0.359 76.4 0.440 76.4 0.082 -0.01
Between 0.111 23.6 0.136 23.6 0.025 0.01
Contribution to the Race 0.014 12.2 0.016 11.8 0.002 -0.40
between component Gender 0.018 16.7 0.017 12.7 -0.001 -4.00
(Shapley Value) Education 0.070 63.4 0.093 68.3 0.023 4.90




Let ! = ( !!,   . . . , !") be a partition of the wage distribution into K mutually and 
exclusive groups, being (# the population size associated with the group !#, where ( =
∑ (#"#$! . Then, we know that the headcount ratio (*) can be written as  
H(z) = ∑ %!%
&
'$! H'(z),     (2) 
where - is the relative poverty line, %!%  is the population share of group k, and H'(z) is 
the headcount ratio for group	k. Therefore, the poverty share of group 0 is 
1%!% H'(z)2 /H(z). 
In addition, we know that the pandemic increases poverty in all groups, although this 
increase is uneven across them (recall Section 2). As a result, there is a penalty (premium) 
in terms of poverty for those workers with the most disadvantageous (advantageous) 
characteristics. To calculate this penalty, we propose the relative poverty risk which for 
group 0 is the change in the poverty of this group over the change in total poverty: 
4# =
∆)"
∆)	 ,      (3) 
where the operator ∆ indicates the change of the variable under consideration. 
By setting up the change in total poverty as our reference, the measure of relative poverty 
risk has a straightforward interpretation. If R' > 1 the increase in poverty for group 0 is 
bigger than the increase in poverty for the whole population and, therefore, there is a 
larger risk for the workers of this group than for the mean worker of becoming poor after 
the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. On the contrary, if R' < 1 the members of group 
0 will have a lower probability of becoming poor than the average worker. Our results 
are presented in Table 3 and the robustness checks by regions are shown in Table E1 and 
Figure E1 (see Appendix E).  
The poverty shares across groups (column 3 in Table 3) are uneven and strongly 
determined by their population shares (column 1 in Table 3). Thus, for example, we find 
(column 2 in Table 3) that 49% (H' = 0.488) of workers with primary or no education are 
poor, while this percentage is only 14% (H' = 0.142) for graduated workers. However, 
the poverty share of the former group ─which represents a smaller share in the 
population─ is lower than the poverty share of the latter, and a similar pattern is observed 
for race and gender. If we now focus on the initial poverty level, it is observed that this 




race (correlation: 0.87) and education (correlation: 0.96), but not for gender because 
female workers show greater initial poverty than their male counterparts but a lower 
change in poverty (correlation: -1.00). 
When we use expression (3) to calculate the poverty penalty that the restrictions cause on 
the workers with disadvantageous characteristics, we observe that Whites and Asians 
have the lowest relative poverty risk (4# < 1), while Blacks and above all Hispanics and 
Other races present the highest (4# > 1). By education levels, the relationship is negative 
and monotonic: the higher the education level, the lower the relative poverty risk. Thus, 
to have primary or no education increases the most the probability of becoming poor after 
the stay-at-home orders and social distancing measures (in comparison with the average 
worker): 47%. On the other hand, relative poverty risk is the lowest for those workers 
with tertiary education, being their probability of becoming poor half the one of the 
average worker.  
 




The range of the gaps in relative poverty risk found by education levels seems to indicate 
that education is the most important characteristic explaining the economic impact of the 
restrictions on poverty and has a buffering effect on the probability of becoming poor. 
This is more evident when we cross the four dimensions under consideration. First, 
regardless of sex and race (Figure 1), and of region (Figure E1 in Appendix E), all 
population groups tend to reduce their relative poverty risk as their education level 
increases. Second, the differences in relative poverty risk among sexes and races tend to 
Population Initial Poverty Poverty Relative 
Share Poverty Share Change Poverty Risk
k nk/N Hk [(nk/N)·Hk]/H ∆Hk Rk = ∆Hk/∆H
Asian 0.063 0.233 0.052 0.094 0.971
Black 0.127 0.355 0.159 0.106 1.097
Hispanic 0.118 0.352 0.147 0.125 1.297
Other 0.087 0.362 0.111 0.131 1.353
White 0.605 0.247 0.530 0.084 0.874
Total 1.000 0.282 1.000 0.096 1.000
Female 0.480 0.343 0.584 0.088 0.912
Male 0.520 0.226 0.416 0.104 1.081
Total 1.000 0.282 1.000 0.096 1.000
Primary 0.081 0.488 0.141 0.142 1.470
Secondary 0.249 0.375 0.332 0.135 1.403
Post-Secondary 0.308 0.317 0.346 0.108 1.122
Graduate 0.361 0.142 0.181 0.049 0.511







disappear at the national (Figure 1) and regional (Figure E1 in Appendix E) levels when 
education is higher. In fact, differences in relative poverty risk for the group of graduated 
workers are almost inexistent, not only for the whole of the US but also for each of the 
four US regions (West, Mid-West, South, and North-East). 
 
5. Rank mobility in the wage distribution 
The absolute changes in labor income derived of the restrictions imposed to prevent the 
spread of the pandemic imply higher levels of inequality and poverty. However, these 
changes in wages also alter the relative position that workers have in the wage 
distribution. By comparing the pre- and post-restrictions wage distributions, we can 




∑ [:,(=) − :,(= − 1)]
+"
,$! ,     (4) 
where :,(= − 1) represents the pre-pandemic percentile rank of worker @ in the global 
wage distribution and :,(=) is the rank of that individual in the wage distribution after 
being imposed the restrictions to curb the propagation of the pandemic.  
 
Figure 1. Relative poverty risk in the US by race, gender and education. 
 
 
The changes in rank for the different groups present quite distinct patterns (see Figure 2). 
We consistently find that women tend to move up in the percentile rank, especially those 
with higher educational levels. In fact, educated women for all races move up if they are 


































group rank as long as they have secondary or post-secondary education. Men, on the other 
hand, see their mean group rank go down for all races if they are less than graduates, with 
the exception of Hispanic and Others with primary education, which have a slight 
increase. Even if they are graduates, men from all races can on average only maintain 
their relative status among workers. The gender divides of the restrictions on the labor 
market seems to reshuffle women up in the wage rank distribution, especially educated 
women of any race and black women of any educational level. This at the expense of non-
educated men in general and, more strongly, of Asian non-graduate men.  
 






This paper has presented a detailed picture of the uneven effects that the lockdown and 
social distancing measures implemented to prevent the propagation of the COVID-19 
pandemic are causing on the wage distribution in the United States overall and, crucially, 
for different sociodemographic groups based on gender, race and education.  
Our results reveal a sizeable increase in wage inequality (4.1 Gini points) and poverty 
(9.7 percentage points) at the national level, with inequality and poverty increasing in all 
of the US states. We find that, although wages losses occur across the board, there are 
major disparities in the impact on workers from different sociodemographic groups, being 
the differences in the education level the main factor associated to between-groups 
































gender, we find that women tend to have occupations with higher capacity to keep 
working under the restrictions imposed during the pandemic than men and, on average, 
their increase in poverty is lower and they tend to move up in the wage distribution rank. 
Across races, White and Asian workers suffer on average a smaller increase in poverty 
than Hispanics, Blacks and Other races.  
Our findings also reveal that a cross-dimensional perspective can help to better recognize 
the social groups most impacted by the stay-at-home orders and social distancing 
measures. We find that differences in poverty risk by race or gender converge at higher 
educational levels and are minimal for graduates. Additionally, differences by gender 
within a given race are substantial only for Blacks, where women have a significantly 
lower poverty risk than men at all educational levels except graduate. Finally, the Asian 
group presents a particularly striking divide. The small relative poverty risk for Asians as 
a whole masks the fact that the subgroup of less educated Asians is significantly more 
exposed to poverty increases and downward mobility after the restrictions than any other 
race with equivalent qualifications. 
The contention measures taken to control the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic have 
saved many lives in the US and elsewhere, preventing the collapse of the healthcare 
system and, possibly, of the whole economy. Still, the economic impact of the stay-at-
home orders and social distancing measures have been enormous and its burden unevenly 
distributed. Thus far, the emergency assistance programmes implemented in the US have 
provided generalized stimulus checks and unemployment schemes, but these benefits 
could be better targeted if some of the differential effects found here are considered. Thus, 
implemented policies may have not weighted appropriately the unequal impact across 
industries and occupations of the restrictions applied to curb the spread of COVID-19, 
which could call for longer schemes for most affected industries, where the vulnerable 
groups we identify here are more heavily represented. Also, the progressivity of the 
stimulus checks put in place may have been insufficient (for example, single individuals 
making less than $75,000 receive the same payment) since we estimate large increases in 
wage inequality and poverty not only at the national level but also within all the states. 
Finally, interventions to expand education and access to shock-resilient employment 
could be put in place, not only to palliate the differential vulnerability to poverty and 
wage inequality found here, but also to provide more equal opportunities for people in 




that the results found here can contribute to inform better targeted policies aiming to 
counteract the negative effects of the COVID-19 restrictions and to increase the resilience 
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Appendix A: The matrices of essentiality, closure and teleworking. 
Our classification of occupations and industries is based on the Cibersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
which during the pandemic developed a guidance of “Essential Critical Infrastructure 
Workforce”, identifying sectors that should continue working based on its essentiality. 
The CISA guidance has been revised and updated during the pandemic. In our study we 
use the first version in order to capture the guidance issued for the initial lockdown, which 
we model. The guidance was not mandatory and each US state was free to use it or not. 
Despite that not all states have fully followed the CISA reference, we apply it generally 
for two main reasons. First, we want to consider the same stay-at-home orders and social 
distancing conditions for all states to make homogenous comparisons among them. 
Second, we want to isolate the economic effects of the restrictions due to the pandemic 
from particular decisions adopted by the state governments. In this manner, we can 
evaluate how the productive structure of a given state influences the economic effect of 
the pandemic on its levels of inequality and poverty.12 
By applying CISA we identify which critical infrastructures (2018 Census Code and 2018 
NAICS code, 4 digits) and essential workforces (2018 ACS code, 4 digits) are essential. 
This is a crucial point as we need to translate the CISA information into IPUMS industry 
and occupation codes (at the 4-digit level). CISA identifies 18 critical infrastructures and 
lists the number of essential workforces related to each sector. Using this information, we 
match each CISA category to industry (271 sectors at the 4-digit level) and occupation 
(530 occupations at the 4-digit level). The results are shown in Table A1 which for 
simplicity are presented at the 3-digit level: 21 sectors and 12 occupations. Thus, for 
example, the “Retail trade” industry (3-digit level) actually refers to the following 
industries at the 4-digit level: “Supermarkets and Grocery”, “Pharmacies and Drug store”, 
“Gasoline stations”, “Florists”, “Automobile dealers”, “Electronic stores”, “Clothing 
stores”, “Gift, novelty, and souvenir stores” and “Jewellery, luggage, and leather goods 
stores”.13 Based on the CISA guidance, we first construct the matrix of essentiality (Table 




12 At the early stage, Forsythe et al. (2020) find that the labor market collapsed at the same time across the 
U.S. irrespective of the state-level policies imposed.  




The matrix of essentiality 
To assign the essentiality score at the 4-digit level (271 industries and 530 occupations), 
we adopt the following procedure. First, if a given industry or occupation is referred by 
CISA, it receives a value of 1 (completely essential). For example, in the “Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting, and Mining” sector all industries are essential so that they 
receive a value of 1. Second, if CISA does not include any specific reference to a given 
industry or occupation but it is deduced that it is needed for the essential infrastructure, 
then we assign it a value of partial essentiality (the more critical is the industry or 
occupation, the higher the assigned value). For example, the ‘florists’ from the Retail 
Trade Industry: While CISA does not make any specific reference to them, this activity 
has been maintained to some extent to support hospitality and charity. Based on this 
criterion, we assign the following values of partial essentiality to the supportive industries 
and occupations: 0.8 to “Construction”; 0.7 to “Administrative and support and waste 
management services”; 0.5 to “Manufacturing”; and 0.2 to “Retail Trade” and 
“Wholesale trade”. Finally, for the rest of cases, the industry or occupation is considered 
as non-essential and receives a value equal to 0.  
In total, we find that 56 industries are completely essential, 88 industries are partially 
essential and the remain 127 industries are non-essential. The same assignment procedure 
is applied to the list of occupations. As a result, we find that 141 occupations are 
completely essential, 74 are partially essential and the rest (315) of occupations are non-
essential. 
Once we have assigned the essentiality score to each industry and occupation, we build 
the A,+-./01,2/	B	C344.560,3+/ matrix of essentiality. For this task we use the following 
mechanism:  
D7+ = E
 D7 × D+	    @G D7 ≠ 1    
	   1	 	 	 @G D7 = 1
    (A1) 
 
According to the above expression if the essentiality of the industry is completed 
(E8 = 1), the score given to the cell J	B	( of the essentiality matrix (D7+) is 1. 
However, if the essentiality of the industry is partial or null (E8 ≠ 1), the method in [A1] 
assigns the result of multiplying D7 by D+ to the cell D7+. Hence, the industry-occupation 
combination is non-essential (D7+ = 0) when either the industry is not essential (E8 =





Table A1: Correspondences between CISA and industry and occupations codes. 
 
CISA Category Industry  Occupation  
CHEMICAL 
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas 
Extraction Construction and Extraction Occupations 
Manufacturing Production Occupations 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services Computer, Engineering, and Science Occupations 
COMMERCIAL 
FACILITIES 
Accommodation and Food Services 
Education, Legal, Community Service, Arts, and 
Media Occupations 
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 
Sales and Related Occupations 
Production Occupations 




Information Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupations 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services Computer, Engineering, and Science Occupations 
CRITICAL 
MANUFACTURING 
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas 
Extraction 
Construction and Extraction Occupations 
Transportation and Material Moving Occupations 
Manufacturing 
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL 
BASE Military Transportation and Material Moving Occupations 
EDUCATION 
Educational Services Education, Legal, Community Service, Arts, and 
Media Occupations Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services 
ENERGY 
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas 
Extraction Construction and Extraction Occupations 
Utilities 
Wholesale Trade 
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupations 
Construction 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Finance and Insurance 
Management, Business, and Financial Occupations 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 
FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURE 
Accommodation and Food Services Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and 
Hunting Production Occupations 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 







Administrative and support and waste 
management services Office and Administrative Support Occupations 
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas 
Extraction Construction and Extraction Occupations 
HEALTHCARE / PUBLIC 
HEALTH 
Health Care and Social Assistance Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services Service Occupations 
Administrative and support and waste 
management services Office and Administrative Support Occupations 
HYGIENE PRODUCTS 
AND SERVICES 
Health Care and Social Assistance Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations 
Retail Trade 
Service Occupations 





PUBLIC SAFETY, AND 
OTHER FIRST 
RESPONDERS 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services 
Education, Legal, Community Service, Arts, and 
Media Occupations 
Management of companies and 
enterprises Management, Business, and Financial Occupations 
Military Transportation and Material Moving Occupations 




Administrative and support and waste 
management services Office and Administrative Support Occupations 
Management of companies and 
enterprises 
Education, Legal, Community Service, Arts, and 
Media Occupations 
Management, Business, and Financial Occupations 









AND REAL ESTATE, AND 
RELATED SERVICES 
Health Care and Social Assistance Healthcare Practitioners and Technical 
Occupations 
Other Services, Except Public 
Administration 
Accommodation and Food Services 




Transportation and Warehousing 




Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupations 
Transportation and Material Moving Occupations 
 
By using this method, we compute the value of 143,630 cells (271 industries times 530 
occupations) with the following distribution: 30.210 cells receive the highest value of 
essentiality; 18,920 cells receive a score of partial essentiality, and 94,500 cells represent 
non-essential combinations. In total, after matching the value of these cells with the ACS 
database, 508,148 observations have a job with some degree of essentiality, being the 
essentiality average 0.309. 
 
The matrix of closure 
The matrix of closure is built following two stages. First, for any J	B	( combination of 
the matrix that has a positive essentiality score (D7+ > 0), its score of closure is 0 (L7+ =
0). That is, the J	B	( combination cannot be closed if it is considered to be part of a 
critical infrastructure. Second, for all non-essential J	B	( combinations, the score of 




Entertainments and Recreation”, “Accommodation and Food Services”, “Wholesale 
trade” and “Retail Trade”.14 In sum, out of 143,630 cells, 113,150 cells are classified as 
non-closed activities (78.7% of the total) while 30,480 cells are considered to be closed 
(21.3%). In total, 271,643 observations have a job with some degree of closure, being the 
closure average 0.181.  
 
The matrix of teleworking 
Following Dingel and Neiman (2020), we estimate occupational teleworking by making 
use of the teleworking information acquired from some key attributes of occupations in 
the American O*NET database. Then, we use the latest 2019 wave of ACS (2020 release) 
to obtain occupational teleworking information for the US occupational categories. In 
total, 601,710 observations have a job that is neither essential nor closed, with an average 
teleworking equal to 0.430.  
 
14 Note that the scores in Table A3 are averages at the 3-digit level and, for this reason, there are scores of 


























































0.000 0.508 1.000 0.000 0.543 0.000 0.389 0.997 0.289 0.000 0.275 1.000 0.492 0.032 0.067 0.656 0.000 0.058 0.277 1.000 0.047 0.517
Education, Legal, 
Community 
Service, Arts, and 
Media Occupations























0.000 0.067 1.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.077 0.985 0.304 0.000 0.126 1.000 0.003 0.069 0.308 0.727 0.000 0.194 0.097 1.000 0.001 0.303
Production 
Occupations 0.000 0.261 1.000 0.000 0.276 0.000 0.048 0.995 0.130 0.000 0.184 1.000 0.188 0.289 0.094 0.713 0.000 0.369 0.087 1.000 0.039 0.242
Sales and Related 
Occupations 0.000 0.047 1.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.980 0.364 0.000 0.145 1.000 0.000 0.157 0.054 0.696 0.000 0.206 0.013 1.000 0.000 0.142




0.000 0.469 1.000 0.000 0.297 0.000 0.099 0.964 0.213 0.000 0.083 1.000 0.236 0.125 0.086 0.746 0.000 0.313 0.164 1.000 0.029 0.219



























































1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.503 0.156 0.000 0.369 0.014
Education, Legal, 
Community 
Service, Arts, and 
Media Occupations























1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.312 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.529 0.306 0.000 0.501 0.149
Production 
Occupations 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.470 0.348 0.000 0.465 0.059
Sales and Related 
Occupations 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.590 0.433 0.000 0.476 0.441




1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.502 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.504 0.172 0.000 0.339 0.236





























































0.000 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001
Education, Legal, 
Community 
Service, Arts, and 
Media Occupations























0.478 0.737 0.838 0.656 0.892 0.842 0.609 0.679 0.598 0.818 0.602 0.802 0.776 0.795 0.805 0.755 0.824 0.654 0.446 0.702 0.708 0.681
Production 
Occupations 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.017 0.011 0.016 0.020 0.087 0.106 0.000 0.010 0.012 0.001 0.041 0.023 0.008 0.012 0.021 0.008 0.001 0.014 0.013
Sales and Related 
Occupations 0.044 0.609 0.769 0.196 0.895 0.356 0.958 0.625 0.552 0.736 0.879 0.310 0.937 0.711 0.748 0.505 0.523 0.015 0.728 0.874 0.953 0.325




0.012 0.033 0.004 0.020 0.012 0.015 0.049 0.065 0.044 0.054 0.017 0.046 0.009 0.014 0.047 0.078 0.029 0.076 0.027 0.033 0.033 0.037




Appendix B: Modelling the individual capacity to work under the stay-at-home 
orders and social distancing measures. 
The Lockdown Working Ability (LWA) index (Palomino et al., 2020) is the following: 
!"#! 	= &
'! 	 + (1 − '!)-! .! = /
(1 − 0!)-! .! = 1
-! .! ≠ /, 1
, 
for all 4 ∈ {1, 2, … , 9}, where / and 1 represent an occupation that is essential and closed, 
respectively. By using this index, we calculate the wage loss (;<) experienced by every 
individual during the lockdown:  
;<!" = ;!"#$ · >! · (1 − !"#!) 
where ;!"#$ is the annual wage of individual 4 in period ? − 1 (before the stay-at-home 
orders) and >! represents the duration of the lockdown in annual terms, i.e., >! = %$%.  
However, if the individual has a closed occupation, we need to additionally consider the 
wage loss due to the imposed partial functioning of their occupation for ten additional 
months. The relevant scenario is represented in Figure B1. 
 
Figure B1. The evolution of a closed occupation during the pandemic. 
 
 
Formally, the evolution of the pandemic for a closed occupation can be represented by 
the following exponential function: 
@(A) = &
1 0 < A ≤ 2
E&#% 2 < A ≤ 6
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where A defines the month under consideration, E = 0.67 and I = 0.71. The values 
given to the variables E and I are those implied by the function represented in Figure B1. 
In this respect, note that @(A) should start in 1 at the beginning of the third month (after 
the lockdown), and then decrease exponentially –between the 2nd and 6th month– until the 
functioning of closed occupations reaches 80% of full capacity (20% closure). After the 
sixth month, a second wave of the pandemic interrupts the economy which provokes an 
increasing difficulty of functioning for individuals with closed occupations. The 
increasing effects of the shrink in demand (caused by the fear to contagion) and the 
measures implemented by authorities are assumed to last for four months (at this point 
the partial functioning of closed occupations is only 20%, 80% closure). Later, the 
functioning of closed occupations recovers exponentially for at least the next two months 
for which the level of closure is 40%.  
This evolution implies that the wage loss experienced by those individuals with a closed 





(       
where the ratio $$% is a normalization term to transform monthly data into annual data. 
Now, if we decompose the wage loss in the above expression, we have:  
;<!" = ;!"#$
$




% LA + ∫ 0.8 · I
|$(#&|$%
) LAN. 






- − 1) + 0.8 · $*+. (I
- + I% − 2)N. 
Hence, the wage loss for each worker with a closed occupation is approximately:  
;<!" ≈ ;!"#$ · 	0.5745366. 
Note that for any worker, the general formula of the wage loss is the following: 











where  1/ = X
1 4Y	.! = 1	





Appendix C: The Lockdown Working Ability (LWA) Index in the US. 
In this Appendix we show the decomposition of the LWA index by levels of essentiality, 
closure, and teleworking across the US states. In addition, we present the values of this 
index by states and social groups according to people’s race, gender and education.  
 
 




















Male Female Asian Black Hispanic Other White Primary Secondary Post-Secondary Graduate
Alabama (AL) 0.547 0.475 0.622 0.619 0.472 0.439 0.500 0.583 0.336 0.384 0.527 0.783
Alaska (AK) 0.620 0.545 0.712 0.544 0.836 0.549 0.525 0.595 0.357 0.507 0.638 0.748
Arizona (AZ) 0.579 0.520 0.646 0.666 0.585 0.500 0.512 0.625 0.344 0.435 0.573 0.776
Arkansas (AR) 0.540 0.455 0.629 0.551 0.520 0.449 0.421 0.559 0.386 0.412 0.539 0.747
California (CA) 0.591 0.545 0.645 0.673 0.599 0.511 0.491 0.656 0.378 0.424 0.551 0.783
Colorado (CO) 0.609 0.562 0.662 0.619 0.581 0.497 0.530 0.643 0.328 0.424 0.549 0.776
Connecticut (CT) 0.618 0.557 0.682 0.712 0.583 0.476 0.450 0.659 0.339 0.452 0.558 0.789
Delaware (DE) 0.605 0.530 0.681 0.722 0.602 0.526 0.404 0.620 0.330 0.474 0.573 0.785
District of Columbia (D.C) 0.748 0.730 0.765 0.654 0.550 0.501 0.485 0.611 0.327 0.469 0.580 0.856
Florida (FL) 0.556 0.494 0.622 0.596 0.550 0.505 0.487 0.588 0.339 0.414 0.542 0.746
Georgia (GA) 0.564 0.494 0.637 0.601 0.526 0.452 0.447 0.609 0.321 0.392 0.536 0.771
Hawaii (HI) 0.556 0.528 0.587 0.775 0.648 0.786 0.605 0.838 0.294 0.409 0.531 0.740
Idaho (ID) 0.577 0.517 0.647 0.594 0.720 0.495 0.496 0.591 0.431 0.429 0.553 0.787
Illinois (IL) 0.577 0.507 0.652 0.696 0.540 0.449 0.425 0.617 0.285 0.384 0.527 0.776
Indiana (IN) 0.528 0.444 0.618 0.592 0.518 0.423 0.389 0.540 0.257 0.364 0.523 0.771
Iowa (IA) 0.581 0.496 0.670 0.620 0.478 0.469 0.491 0.594 0.403 0.406 0.550 0.787
Kansas (KS) 0.596 0.533 0.666 0.631 0.483 0.459 0.487 0.626 0.371 0.430 0.572 0.786
Kentucky (KY) 0.542 0.453 0.633 0.643 0.456 0.454 0.406 0.555 0.301 0.377 0.541 0.762
Louisiana (LA) 0.559 0.472 0.648 0.561 0.518 0.455 0.522 0.588 0.360 0.444 0.544 0.771
Maine (ME) 0.600 0.524 0.674 0.485 0.718 0.526 0.556 0.602 0.352 0.461 0.561 0.779
Maryland (MD) 0.648 0.584 0.712 0.696 0.644 0.541 0.478 0.680 0.347 0.452 0.594 0.827
Massachusetts (MA) 0.655 0.596 0.716 0.714 0.635 0.523 0.497 0.679 0.358 0.461 0.580 0.808
Michigan (MI) 0.531 0.452 0.617 0.626 0.449 0.464 0.445 0.549 0.275 0.345 0.507 0.749
Minnesota (MN) 0.611 0.534 0.695 0.623 0.564 0.470 0.517 0.625 0.362 0.425 0.563 0.783
Mississippi (MS) 0.515 0.427 0.603 0.505 0.459 0.307 0.436 0.562 0.320 0.359 0.507 0.772
Missouri (MO) 0.574 0.493 0.658 0.681 0.548 0.516 0.475 0.580 0.319 0.409 0.547 0.783
Montana (MT) 0.580 0.530 0.635 0.840 0.266 0.601 0.541 0.583 0.368 0.437 0.552 0.749
Nebraska (NE) 0.616 0.539 0.701 0.643 0.604 0.484 0.469 0.637 0.404 0.462 0.565 0.799
Nevada (NV) 0.442 0.391 0.501 0.428 0.452 0.349 0.333 0.516 0.240 0.297 0.466 0.673
New Hampshire (NH) 0.601 0.523 0.684 0.585 0.606 0.540 0.436 0.608 0.389 0.414 0.531 0.796
New Jersey (NJ) 0.626 0.572 0.686 0.748 0.607 0.505 0.456 0.666 0.342 0.443 0.568 0.792
New Mexico (NM) 0.599 0.535 0.668 0.721 0.586 0.549 0.559 0.667 0.383 0.447 0.599 0.808
New York (NY) 0.630 0.556 0.706 0.628 0.642 0.571 0.525 0.657 0.411 0.474 0.584 0.778
North Carolina (NC) 0.568 0.500 0.638 0.641 0.512 0.468 0.432 0.606 0.320 0.379 0.537 0.781
North Dakota (ND) 0.601 0.513 0.700 0.555 0.504 0.580 0.507 0.615 0.398 0.470 0.540 0.818
Ohio (OH) 0.559 0.477 0.646 0.657 0.518 0.439 0.463 0.570 0.298 0.383 0.547 0.777
Oklahoma (OK) 0.565 0.500 0.636 0.593 0.581 0.429 0.521 0.589 0.310 0.436 0.571 0.778
Oregon (OR) 0.576 0.516 0.640 0.577 0.570 0.503 0.494 0.594 0.368 0.411 0.539 0.760
Pennsylvania (PA) 0.598 0.517 0.683 0.638 0.584 0.527 0.485 0.608 0.340 0.428 0.573 0.793
Rhode Island (RI) 0.602 0.516 0.693 0.684 0.603 0.507 0.446 0.627 0.298 0.446 0.583 0.776
South Carolina (SC) 0.535 0.456 0.615 0.467 0.463 0.438 0.453 0.576 0.313 0.363 0.520 0.753
South Dakota (SD) 0.597 0.514 0.683 0.452 0.614 0.505 0.641 0.598 0.385 0.442 0.585 0.774
Tennessee (TN) 0.535 0.451 0.623 0.588 0.484 0.414 0.431 0.556 0.316 0.364 0.516 0.754
Texas (TX) 0.570 0.513 0.637 0.683 0.557 0.503 0.479 0.628 0.332 0.425 0.553 0.784
Utah (UT) 0.580 0.544 0.624 0.613 0.445 0.424 0.435 0.615 0.287 0.429 0.561 0.767
Vermont (VT) 0.588 0.523 0.655 0.454 0.731 0.490 0.615 0.588 0.425 0.417 0.540 0.755
Virginia (VA) 0.626 0.564 0.691 0.714 0.574 0.530 0.486 0.655 0.315 0.424 0.570 0.817
Washington (WA) 0.617 0.574 0.668 0.551 0.611 0.598 0.635 0.626 0.427 0.437 0.577 0.788
West Virginia (WV) 0.566 0.480 0.662 0.619 0.475 0.662 0.592 0.568 0.308 0.447 0.565 0.797
Wisconsin (WI) 0.558 0.465 0.655 0.569 0.519 0.464 0.454 0.571 0.319 0.372 0.531 0.771
Wyoming (WY) 0.600 0.526 0.685 0.581 0.693 0.521 0.439 0.617 0.407 0.487 0.592 0.773





Appendix D: Changes in inequality and poverty in the US by states of residence. 
 
In this Appendix we show the changes in inequality and poverty according to the Gini 
coefficient, MLD, and Headcount ratio by regions and population subgroups. 
 
 
 Table D1. Changes in inequality and poverty in the US by states.  
 







Original After Δ Original After Δ Original After Δ
Alabama (AL) 0.456 0.496 4.0 0.449 0.551 10.2 0.297 0.382 8.5
Alaska (AK) 0.432 0.467 3.5 0.427 0.519 9.2 0.302 0.375 7.3
Arizona (AZ) 0.459 0.502 4.3 0.442 0.548 10.5 0.271 0.373 10.2
Arkansas (AR) 0.455 0.484 3.0 0.430 0.511 8.1 0.256 0.361 10.5
California (CA) 0.497 0.539 4.2 0.500 0.614 11.5 0.267 0.371 10.5
Colorado (CO) 0.465 0.506 4.1 0.457 0.565 10.8 0.285 0.377 9.1
Connecticut (CT) 0.504 0.543 3.9 0.529 0.646 11.7 0.306 0.387 8.1
Delaware (DE) 0.455 0.494 3.8 0.446 0.549 10.2 0.263 0.344 8.1
District of Colu (D.C) 0.438 0.464 2.6 0.435 0.516 8.1 0.294 0.340 4.7
Florida (FL) 0.472 0.521 4.9 0.445 0.561 11.7 0.282 0.389 10.8
Georgia (GA) 0.475 0.515 4.1 0.466 0.572 10.6 0.272 0.368 9.6
Hawaii (HI) 0.414 0.474 5.9 0.373 0.488 11.6 0.277 0.402 12.5
Idaho (ID) 0.464 0.504 4.0 0.482 0.582 10.0 0.273 0.374 10.1
Illinois (IL) 0.475 0.516 4.1 0.467 0.573 10.5 0.267 0.362 9.5
Indiana (IN) 0.449 0.490 4.1 0.430 0.528 9.8 0.271 0.362 9.1
Iowa (IA) 0.433 0.470 3.7 0.399 0.484 8.5 0.278 0.361 8.2
Kansas (KS) 0.447 0.484 3.7 0.420 0.512 9.1 0.281 0.365 8.3
Kentucky (KY) 0.450 0.490 4.0 0.437 0.535 9.8 0.296 0.382 8.7
Louisiana (LA) 0.466 0.506 3.9 0.465 0.570 10.5 0.308 0.396 8.8
Maine (ME) 0.438 0.478 3.9 0.415 0.512 9.7 0.270 0.352 8.2
Maryland (MD) 0.455 0.494 3.9 0.449 0.555 10.6 0.286 0.369 8.3
Massachusetts (MA) 0.471 0.506 3.6 0.464 0.561 9.7 0.275 0.357 8.2
Michigan (MI) 0.470 0.508 3.8 0.471 0.575 10.4 0.294 0.375 8.2
Minnesota (MN) 0.445 0.482 3.7 0.418 0.506 8.8 0.274 0.357 8.3
Mississippi (MS) 0.461 0.501 4.0 0.450 0.553 10.4 0.269 0.371 10.1
Missouri (MO) 0.450 0.491 4.1 0.425 0.526 10.0 0.285 0.373 8.8
Montana (MT) 0.461 0.499 3.8 0.463 0.566 10.4 0.307 0.386 7.9
Nebraska (NE) 0.421 0.457 3.5 0.371 0.451 7.9 0.261 0.344 8.3
Nevada (NV) 0.452 0.518 6.6 0.424 0.553 12.9 0.257 0.444 18.7
New Hampshire (NH) 0.444 0.485 4.0 0.426 0.529 10.3 0.274 0.365 9.1
New Jersey (NJ) 0.491 0.528 3.7 0.496 0.600 10.4 0.295 0.384 8.9
New Mexico (NM) 0.463 0.504 4.1 0.452 0.560 10.7 0.286 0.377 9.0
New York (NY) 0.495 0.532 3.7 0.501 0.602 10.1 0.291 0.375 8.4
North Carolina (NC) 0.471 0.512 4.1 0.464 0.571 10.8 0.276 0.364 8.8
North Dakota (ND) 0.439 0.475 3.6 0.404 0.492 8.8 0.268 0.355 8.7
Ohio (OH) 0.454 0.494 3.9 0.442 0.541 9.9 0.284 0.371 8.7
Oklahoma (OK) 0.460 0.501 4.1 0.445 0.549 10.4 0.282 0.374 9.2
Oregon (OR) 0.457 0.498 4.0 0.438 0.540 10.1 0.281 0.377 9.6
Pennsylvania (PA) 0.459 0.499 4.0 0.448 0.550 10.2 0.270 0.359 8.9
Rhode Island (RI) 0.434 0.477 4.3 0.405 0.505 10.0 0.255 0.354 9.9
South Carolina (SC) 0.455 0.499 4.3 0.440 0.547 10.6 0.282 0.380 9.8
South Dakota (SD) 0.422 0.461 3.9 0.384 0.473 8.9 0.266 0.346 7.9
Tennessee (TN) 0.466 0.509 4.2 0.451 0.556 10.5 0.274 0.375 10.0
Texas (TX) 0.478 0.519 4.0 0.472 0.580 10.8 0.292 0.384 9.2
Utah (UT) 0.481 0.521 4.0 0.495 0.596 10.2 0.291 0.381 9.1
Vermont (VT) 0.419 0.460 4.2 0.391 0.483 9.1 0.267 0.371 10.4
Virginia (VA) 0.473 0.512 3.9 0.472 0.581 10.9 0.296 0.368 7.2
Washington (WA) 0.466 0.507 4.1 0.454 0.559 10.4 0.280 0.371 9.1
West Virginia (WV) 0.443 0.482 3.9 0.419 0.522 10.4 0.261 0.354 9.4
Wisconsin (WI) 0.430 0.469 4.0 0.393 0.485 9.2 0.264 0.353 8.9
Wyoming (WY) 0.439 0.467 2.8 0.425 0.507 8.2 0.280 0.357 7.7
USA 0.476 0.517 4.1 0.470 0.576 10.7 0.282 0.379 9.6




Appendix E: Poverty risk across regions. 
 
In this Appendix we check the robustness of the poverty risk values found for the 
population subgroups by regions (West, Mid-West, South, and North-East).  
 
 
















Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Asian 1.811 1.900 1.798 2.090 1.320 1.187 0.450 0.459
Black 1.456 0.860 1.555 1.291 1.292 0.966 0.666 0.401
Hispanic 1.577 1.562 1.647 1.467 1.347 1.021 0.669 0.475
Other 1.740 1.615 1.641 1.614 1.451 1.077 0.637 0.603
White 1.040 1.278 1.174 1.346 1.003 1.001 0.426 0.470
Asian 1.866 2.389 2.145 1.867 1.771 0.964 0.475 0.374
Black 1.684 0.990 1.690 1.167 1.560 1.028 0.751 0.483
Hispanic 1.746 1.606 1.845 1.515 1.427 1.193 0.569 0.491
Other 1.777 2.009 1.693 1.622 1.373 1.185 0.650 0.671
White 1.155 1.012 1.303 1.348 1.113 1.015 0.571 0.496
Asian 2.238 2.260 2.286 2.063 1.574 1.703 0.475 0.419
Black 1.325 1.001 1.564 1.219 1.386 1.028 0.751 0.422
Hispanic 1.651 1.412 1.518 1.239 1.253 1.072 0.569 0.612
Other 1.500 1.399 1.560 1.209 1.404 1.064 0.650 0.570
White 1.145 1.211 1.250 1.274 1.108 0.986 0.571 0.488
Asian 2.155 1.500 2.570 2.250 1.365 1.284 0.487 0.418
Black 1.586 0.682 1.814 1.084 1.392 0.919 0.768 0.501
Hispanic 2.296 1.519 1.901 1.622 1.427 1.277 0.645 0.609
Other 2.320 1.245 1.987 1.498 1.660 1.156 0.757 0.880
White 1.210 1.113 1.363 1.395 1.162 1.042 0.503 0.490
Asian 2.013 1.980 2.114 2.125 1.471 1.330 0.460 0.440
Black 1.424 0.933 1.613 1.187 1.402 1.007 0.810 0.439
Hispanic 1.730 1.549 1.677 1.424 1.362 1.112 0.698 0.568
Other 1.789 1.583 1.710 1.513 1.493 1.122 0.716 0.658
White 1.130 1.142 1.253 1.309 1.086 0.998 0.491 0.481
USA


















































































































Asian Black Hispanic Other White

























































































































Asian Black Hispanic Other White





























Asian Black Hispanic Other White
Women − Midwest
